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NEGLIGENCE-Res lpsa Loquitur-APPLICATION TO MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AcTIONs: 1951-1961-Res ipsa loquitur, "the

thing speaks for itself," has been the subject matter of extensive
legal literature1 since its inception almost a century ago. 2 It is
now well settled that res ipsa loquitur is no more than an inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence}1 The doctrine
is applicable4 if an act or occurrence is of the type that ordinarily
would not take place without negligence, assuming the plaintiff
has himself been passive, and if the instrumentality causing the
harm is within the exclusive control of the defendant. 5 The application of res ipsa loquitur to the medical malpractice area has
introduced a number of problems, both legal and philosophical,
resulting in a wide diversity of opinion as to whether the doctrine
should be any more sparingly applied in medical negligence cases
than it should in cases of exploding bottles, airplane crashes or

1 Sec, e.g., Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 183 (1949).
2 "There are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur ••••" Byrne
v. Boadle, 2 H &: C 722, 725, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (1863).
3 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 19.11 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 42 (2d ed. 1955).
4 The statement of the requirements of res ipsa loquitur most often referred to is
that of Erle, C. J., in Scott v•. London &: St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H &: C 596, 601, 159
Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (1865). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940); PROSSER,
op. cit, supra note 3, at 199.
Ii Different writers have given various verbalizations to this requirement. See, e.g.,
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 199: "The apparent cause of the accident is such that
defendant would be responsible for any negligence connected with it • . . ,"
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similar unexpected events. 6 It is often stated that expert medical
testimony is a prerequisite to the establishment of a malpractice
claim, except in the clearest of cases where it can be said that "the
result speaks for itself." 7 Judicial reluctance to expand the number of cases in which expert testimony is not required has been
the foremost obstacle to the invocation of the doctrine. The reasoning of the courts appears to be that, in a majority of cases of
alleged malpractice, it is beyond the capability of a jury of laymen
to decide whether a particular event is of the type that ordinarily
would not take place had due care been exercised. Thus, a failure
to fulfill the first requirement renders the doctrine unavailable.
Whether or not such an approach is too formalistic is arguable.
There are, however, valid arguments that can be suggested for
permitting the use of res ipsa loquitur in the medical negligence
field. First, although expert testimony would be desirable, it is
often impossible to procure. The general reluctance of physicians
to testify against one another is well known, although characterization of this as a "conspiracy of silence" is questionable. 8 But
regardless of the motivation for their unwillingness,9 it is clear
that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action operates under a
serious handicap in obtaining expert medical witnesses. Second,
in many cases of medical or surgical treatment the knowledge of
the facts is peculiarly within the possession of the doctor. 10 More
often than not, the plaintiff was unconscious or totally ignorant
of the procedures that were employed. Third, the confidence and
trust reposed in the doctor by a patient demands that the former
come forward with some explanation of what went wrong. 11 Fi6 In Mogensen v. Hicks, 110 N.W.2d 563, 565 (Iowa 1961), the court, in discussing
the application of res ipsa loquitur to a case involving allergic reaction to an anesthetic,
stated, "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be used sparingly." To the same
general effect, see Morris, "Res Ipsa Loquitur"-Liability Without Fault, 25 INs. COUNSEL J.
97 (1958). However, in Maki v. Murray Hosp., 91 Mont. 251, 264, 7 P.2d 228, 231 (1932),
it was stated that "while the application of the doctrine is usually made in view of
injury by machinery .•. , from its very nature as a doctrine of necessity it should apply
with equal force in cases wherein medical and nursing staffs take the place of machinery
and may, through carelessness or lack of skill, inflict, or permit the infliction of, injury
upon a patient who is thereafter in no position to say how he received his injuries."
7 Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wash. 2d 737, 738-39, 258 P.2d 472, 474 (1953).
8 LOUISELL 8: WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 11 14.02 (1960) and
authorities cited therein.
9 See id. at 11 I 4.03.
10 See Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 825, 291 P .2d 915, 923 (1955).
11 See Cho v. Kempler, 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 349, 2 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (1960).
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nally, it is maintained that the doctrine should not be any less
available to a plaintiff merely because he happens to be suing a
doctor, rather than a bottle manufacturer or an airline.
On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that a physician
is not a warrantor of cures, and, in the interest of fairness, a careful
vigil must be maintained to insure that his liability is based upon
fault. Because the application of res ipsa loquitur is virtually
tantamount to success for the plaintiff,12 and because of the undesirability of holding a physician responsible for every untoward
result, restrictive application of the doctrine is often urged. 13
Thus, the res ipsa loquitur medical malpractice cases bring into
direct conflict the aims of securing a reasonable opportunity for
redress to the innocent patient who is injured by medical treatment, while at the same time protecting from liability the physician who has been free from fault. No easy solution of this dilemma is evident; however, an examination of how the courts
have handled the problem during the last decade may reveal more
clearly the nature of the problems involved and, at the same time,
expose to the light of recent experience a few of the more popular
theories concerning judicial treatment of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine in medical malpractice cases.

Increasing Judicial Acceptance of Res Ipsa Loquitur?
There has been a great deal of alarm expressed by legal writers
about the increasing application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
to the medical malpractice area. 14 The publicity given to a few
decisions, the desire to find trends in the law, and the dire warnings periodically issued by interest groups have probably all contributed to this widespread belief. But the fear that the courts
are applying the doctrine with increasing frequency and decreasing deliberation seems unwarranted in light of a survey of those
appellate decisions which dealt with the use of res ipsa loquitur
in medical negligence cases during the period 1951-1961.
In every case included in the survey, the applicability of the
12 "Plaintiffs rarely lose res ipsa loquitur cases at the jury's hands, except where a
defendant's explanation of the accident is factually very convincing (a relatively rare
occurrence).'' 2 HARPER &: JAMES, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1099.
13 Morris, supra note 6, at 113.
14 E.g., Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur-A Rule of Sympathy in PROCEEDINGS, A.M.A.
R.Ec;IONAL MEDICOLEGAL SYMPOSIUMS 66 (1961); REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE
LAW § !10, at 214 (lid ed. 1956): Morris, supra note 6.
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res ipsa loquitur doctrine, whether dealt with by name or not,
was the subject matter of judicial decision, although not necessarily the ratio decidendi of the particular case. All in all, ninetytwo cases arising in thirty-one different jurisdictions were analyzed and, although such a study is not all-inclusive, it does include
all the cases that could be readily located through legal indexes and
undoubtedly is fairly representative of all the cases actually decided during this period.
In 56.5 percent of the 92 cases studied the courts rejected the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine; in 36.9 percent they accepted it, while
in 6.5 percent of the cases the courts discussed its applicability
but neither accepted nor rejected the doctrine, as shown in the
following table:

Year

Applied

Rejected

1951
1952
1953
1954:
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961

2
2
2
2
5
2
5
4:
4

5
1
7
3
5
4:
2
9
5

3

4

8

7

34:

52

Discussed
but not
Applied or
Rejected

Total

7
8

1

10
5
10

2
2

8
9
18

1

9
8
10

6

92

As can be seen, there was a tendency for the number of such
cases presented to appellate courts to increase somewhat over the
course of the decade, although the increase is hardly startling and
may reflect nothing more than the increase of the incidence of
medical treatment. More importantly, there was a surprising consistency throughout the decade in the rate of judicial rejection of
the doctrine. The rate of rejection in the cases in which application of the doctrine was either accepted or rejected ranged from
about one-half to two-thirds of the cases in any given three-year
period, and for most of the three-year periods the rejection rate
varied only between 55 and 65 percent.15 And the rate of rejec15 By combining the data from the table in the text into three-year periods, the
wide variations of individual years are eliminated.
(Continued on bottom of next page)
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tion at the end of the decade was not significantly different from
that at the beginning.
For the individual states there is somewhat more variation
because of the small number of cases involved, but, even so, similar generalizations can be made. For example, in California,
which far surpasses any other state in the total number of res ipsa
loquitur cases before the courts in the last decade, there have
been 30 res ipsa loquitur-medical malpractice cases in the ten
years since 1951. In 16 of the cases the courts applied the doctrine,
in 12 instances it was rejected, and in two cases a final decision
as to its applicability was not reached.
Although there are many inferences which might be drawn
from these figures-involving a wide range of assumptions and
hypotheses-the reader should be cognizant of the perils involved
in making facile conclusions about what is going on in the trial
courts from a tally of results in appellate court decisions. While
it might be said that appellate cases are merely a reflection of trial
court problems, there is no necessary correlation between the
number or proportion of appellate applications of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine and the number of cases in which the doctrine
is applied in the trial courts. Even farther removed from the
realm of valid inference is the number of instances in which a
claim is made against a physician for malpractice where there is
no direct evidence of negligence and the case is settled before a
suit is filed. Nevertheless, although one ,must be careful not to
over-generalize, appellate decisions can tell us a good deal. At
the very least, it can be said that there is nothing in the data to
support the charge that the courts are moving rapidly in the di15

(Continued)

Year

Cases Deciding
Issue

Rejections

1951-53
1952-54
1953-55
1954-56
1955-57
1956-58
1957-59
1958-60
1959-61

19
17
24
21
23
26
29
29
26

13
11
15
12
11
15
16
18
16

Percent of
Rejections
68%
65
62
57
48
58
55
62
62
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rection of increased use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in the
medical negligence area.

The Problem of Predictability
Of course, like all statistics, these tell us little or nothing
about any particular case, and the foremost difficulty confronting
the legal profession in this area of the law is the absence of any
degree of predictability as to the application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine to any given case which involves an allegation of medical malpractice without specific evidence of negligence. To illustrate the problem, let us assume a not-so-hypothetical fact situation in which a patient was treated for a fractured limb by a
physician who reduced the fracture and placed the limb in a cast
which was so tight that the circulation of the patient's blood was
seriously impaired, and as a result amputation of the limb was
required.
In Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation No. Hosps., 16 the Supreme
Court of Oregon, on facts similar to those stated, affirmed a judgment for defendant doctor, holding that res ipsa loquitur did not
apply to malpractice cases. Yet, on substantially similar facts, the
Iowa Supreme Court, in Daiker v. Martin,11 reversing the lower
court, applied the doctrine. Although these cases arose in different jurisdictions, they, nevertheless, serve as a typical illustration
of the inconsistency discoverable in the res ipsa loquitur malpractice field. 18
Because of the consequence of judicial acceptance of res ipsa
loquitur and because of the uncertainty which has been characteristic of its application to malpractice cases, many attempts have
been made to categorize the types of cases in which the doctrine
will apply, and those in which it will not. 111 With but few exceptions, such classifications are of doubtful value, for not only do
they mislead by creating an impression of being legally exclusive
classes (which they are not), but they also tend to conceal the
uncertainty which has been characteristic of the decisions. Their
226 Or~. 616, 359 P .2d 1090 (1961).
250 Iowa 75, 91 N.W.2d 747 (1958).
Compare Demchuck v. Bralow, 404 Pa. 100, 170 A.2d 868 (1961), and Robinson v.
Wirts, 387 Pa. 291, 127 A.2d 706 (1956), with Klein v. Arnold, 203 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct.
1960). All of these cases involved a punctured esophagus occurring during a gastroscopic
examination.
111 E.g., LOUISELL &: WILLIAMS, op cit. supra note 8, t 14.06.
10
17
18
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only justification seems to be for illustrative purposes, but even
there their value is questionable because of the danger that they
will induce unwarranted reliance on the part of the practicing
attorney.
One of the traditional categories where it is said that res ipsa
loquitur will apply is when the alleged injury is to a healthy area
remote from the area of treatment or operation.20 The rationale
behind such a distinction appears to be that it is within the ability
of a lay jury to say, for example, that in a spinal operation a
patient does not, without negligence, ordinarily receive a burn
on the abdomen. 21 The Michigan Supreme Court, however, in
affirming a judgment non obstante veredicto for the defendants,
refused to recognize such a distinction, in a case where a patient's
ureter was sutured (healthy area) during surgery upon the plaintiff for lysis of bowel adhesion and relief of bowel obstruction, despite expert medical testimony to the effect that the ureter was not
the subject matter of such an operation nor was it standard practice
to suture it. 22 The court, in reaching such a result, relied upon
the failure of the plaintiff to produce expert testimony to the
effect that this was negligent notwithstanding the hemorrhaging
which purportedly created an emergency situation. Although
Michigan denies that it applies res ipsa loquitur in any case,23
the courts have been quite willing to accept an inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence which is the legal equivalent.24
Furthermore, there have been a substantial number of cases in
the last decade which, although not discussing such a proposed
category have, in essence, similarly rejected it.25
A traditional class where it has been suggested that res ipsa
loquitur is inapplicable is where the plaintiff has been the victim
of an adverse result of a medical technique known to produce
20 Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy, 248 Iowa 294, 79 N.W.2d 306
(1957); Higdon v. Carlebach, 348 Mich. 363, 83 N.W.2d 296 (1957); LoUISELL & WILLIAMS,
op. cit. supra note 8, 1f 14.06 at 439.
21 Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy, supra note 20.
22 Lince v. Monson, 363 Mich. 135, 108 N.W.2d 845 (1961).
23 E.g., Loveland v. Nelson, 235 Mich. 623, 209 N.W. 835 (1926).
24. E.g., LeFaive v. Asselin, 262 Mich. 443, 247 N.W. 911 (1933). See also Loveland v.
Nelson, supra note 23.
21i E.g., McDermott v. St. Mary's Hosp., 144 Conn. 417, 133 A.2d 608 (1957) (bums on
legs during contraction of uterus); Rhodes v. DeHaan, 184 Kan. 473, 337 P.2d 1043
(1959) (injury to arm in connection with an abdominal operation); Smith v. American
cystoscope Makers, 44 Wash. 2d 202, 266 P .2d 792 (1954) (bums and a wrenched back
during a prostate gland operation).
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some untoward results on occasion, notwithstanding the exercise
of due care.26 Cases falling within such a class have been denominated the so-called "calculated risk" cases. The apparent reason
for the rejection of the doctrine in such a case is the inability to
say that this injury is of the type that ordinarily would not occur
without negligence.27 Multitudinous problems are involved in
determining whether a particular treatment or operation contains
some element of risk, the primary one being the evidentiary problem of establishing the risk itself. Whether statistics are admissible for this purpose, assuming that they are available (which is
often not the case), or whether the past experience of the defendant or even of his expert witnesses are relevant, and the weight
to accord such evaluations, are problems lacking in an easy solution. Leaving such issues aside, however, and assuming that a
particular calculated risk is generally accepted, the recurrent question of judicial treatment of such a case leads to the conclusion
that uniformity of result is largely a myth. 28 Exemplary of this
position is the case of partial or complete paralysis following the
administration of a spinal anesthetic.29 In Hall v. United States, 30
the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital as a routine obstetrical
case. Following receipt of a spinal anesthetic, plaintiff developed
paralysis resulting in the loss of control over her bladder, bowels
and legs. The court, in rejecting the res ipsa loquitur principle,
relied on the failure of the plaintiff to prove that the injury would
not have occurred without negligence.31 However, in a case decided the same year by the Supreme Court of California, res ipsa
loquitur was applied to substantially similar facts. 32
To condemn all classifications, without recognizing that in a
few situations there is some unanimity of opinion, is to do an
injustice. The situation which appears to have produced the
26 See Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P .2d 520 (1953); Engelking v. Carlson,
13 Cal. 2d 216, 88 P.2d 695 (1939); Comment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 80 (1956).
27 Comment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 80 (1956).
28 There is a possible exception with respect to the electroshock treatment cases
where, for the most part, there has been uniformity. See, e.g., Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal.
2d 503, 254 P .2d 520 (1953); Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 192 S.W.2d 992 (1946).
29 See Comment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 80, 85 (1956).
ao 136 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. La. 1955), afj'd, 234 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1956).
31 Accord, Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1951).
32 Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P .2d 915 (1955). See also Bauer v. Otis, 133
Cal. App. 2d 439, 284 P.2d 133 (1955); Toy v. Rickert, 53 N.J. Super. 27, 146 A.2d 510
(1958).
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most agreement is the so-called foreign body case, where, in general, the courts have been willing to say that "the thing speaks
for itself." Resort to the first requirement of the doctrine has
been characteristic of the judicial attitude, the proposition being
that it is within the common knowledge of laymen that surgical
needles,33 forceps?" sponges,35 cloth sacks,36 rubber tubes, 37 and
Kelly clamps38 are not ordinarily left in a patient's body in the
absence of negligence. However, in Landsberg v. Kolodny,39 the
court asserted that res ipsa loquitur was rebutted by a showing
on the part of the defendant that causing a mesh of cotton gauze
to become embedded in the plaintiff's abdomen was attributable
to an emergency situation and not to a lack of due care on defendant's part.
Another category which appears to contain a measure of validity is that of the mistaken diagnosis where it is generally held
that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is inapplicable.40 The reasoning is not that a doctor cannot be held liable for a faulty diagnosis,
but rather that in most cases expert testimony is a prerequisite
to liability because "jurors and courts do not know and are not
permitted arbitrarily to say what are the proper methods of diagnosing and treating human ailments." 41 Thus, support for a
classification is once again sought in the first requirement of res
ipsa loquitur, resulting in the possibility that a court might, on
the proper set of facts, be willing to say that even a lay juror
would know that a particular erroneous diagnosis would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. 42
The inadequacy of the attempted classifications and the general pattern of uncertainty characteristic of the res ipsa loquiturmedical negligence field are attributable to a number of factors.
Much of the confusion in this area is directly attributable to the
Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P .2d 997 (1953).
Swanson v. Hill, 166 F. Supp. 296 (D.N.D. 1958).
Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960).
Tiller v. Von Pohle, 72 Ariz. 11, 230 P.2d 213 (1951).
Mondot v. Vallejo Gen. Hosp., 152 Cal. App. 2d 588, 313 P .2d 78 (1957).
Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P .2d 36 (1956).
145 Cal. App. 2d 158, 302 P.2d 86 (1956).
See Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So. 2d 307, 311 (Fla. 1958); LouISELL & WILLIAMS,
op. cit. supra note 8, 1f 14.06, at 437.
41 Crovella v. Cochrane, supra note 40, at 310.
42 See Weintraub v. Rosen, 93 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1937); Friedman v. Dresel, 139 Cal.
App. 2d 333, 293 P.2d 488 (1956); Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 310 P.2d 722 (1957).
33
34
35
36
37
38
30
40
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judicial treatment of the first requirement of res ipsa loquiturthat the occurrence is of the type that ordinarily would not take
place without negligence. The general proposition with which
the courts normally begin is that expert medical testimony is a
prerequisite in a malpractice case except where it can be said
that a "thing speaks for itself." In deciding upon whether to
instruct the jury on the requirements of the doctrine, the court
must initially determine whether it believes the jury capable of
passing upon the question of whether this result would normally
occur in the absence of negligence. If a court determines that a
jury of laymen is competent to answer this question upon the facts
of a given case, instructions are then given to the effect that if the
jury finds the three requirements to exist they are permitted to
draw an inference of negligence. Here the court itself is, in essence,
first determining whether this event would ordinarily take place
without negligence. If, on the other hand, a court concludes that
upon a particular factual situation a jury of laymen is incapable of
resolving such a question, the request for instruction upon res
ipsa loquitur will be denied. The two points which give rise to all
the confusion are as follows. First, in making the initial decision
on the question of whether a jury possesses sufficient experience to
decide if a particular event would occur without negligence, the
courts are substituting not merely their common knowledge, which
in itself might not be of great consequence, but general considerations concerning the legitimacy of plaintiff's claim. This results
in the inability to say that, on any specific set of facts, the courts
in the future will reach a similar decision. The second point giving
rise to the confusion is the lack of clarity of reasoning by the courts
when they decide against application of the doctrine upon a certain
set of facts. Many courts, rather than saying that this injury does
not speak for itself and, therefore, is not an exception to the rule
that expert medical testimony is a prerequisite to a malpractice
claim, state that res ipsa loquitur does not apply because there is
no expert testimony. Such a difference may appear to be merely
semantic, but it is not. The latter proposition not only opens up
the possibility that expert testimony may be used to lay a foundation for the application of the doctrine, 43 but is also restrictive in
nature because it tends to create an impression that expert testi43

See Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P .2d 85 (1953).
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mony is a prerequisite to instruction upon the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine.
Because of the relative paucity of res ipsa loquitur-medical malpractice cases being presented to the courts, elaborate suggestions
at reformation are impractical. However, the following suggestion,
although minimal, might alleviate some of the uncertainty and present a more equitable approach to both the doctor and the patient.
If a plaintiff in a malpractice action pleads res ipsa loquitur and
the case is not one where it is quite obvious that there has been
negligence, as in the sponge cases, the court should call an expert
medical witness to testify solely on the question of whether this
result would have occurred in the absence of negligence. The witness is not called upon to condemn a fellow practitioner, but merely
to say whether such a result is an expectable one. If the witness
(or witnesses, depending on the court's discretion) testifies that the
injury could normally take place without negligence, res ipsa
loquitur is inapplicable. On the other hand, if he testifies that such
a result is somewhat extraordinary, the doctrine is applied and the
defendant must come forward and rebut the inference. Of course,
factual distinctions which appear to be slight may, nevertheless,
lead to different outcomes and the present significance of the application of the doctrine may not be diminished to any noteworthy
degree, but such an approach would accomplish several things.
First, it would eliminate the problems encountered by a patient
in attempting to obtain expert testimony, at least in those cases
where he intends to rely on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Second,
it would substitute informed objective testimony for what is often
subjective judicial appraisal of the claim, although a court would
certainly not be bound by the expert's testimony. Finally, by
rationalizing the process it would hopefully add a degree of certainty and predictability to an area which is at present plagued by
a lack of such qualities.
Peter D. Byrnes, S.Ed.

